On the sustainability of government deficits: some long-term evidence for Spain, 1850-2000 by Oscar Bajo-Rubio et al.
DOCUMENTOS DE ECONOMÍA Y 
FINANZAS INTERNACIONALES 
 
Working Papers on International 










On the sustainability of government 

















Asociación Española de Economía y Finanzas Internacionales 
www.aeefi.com 
ISSN: 1696-6376 ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
GOVERNMENT DEFICITS: SOME LONG-





(Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha) 
 
Carmen Díaz-Roldán 
 (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha) 
 
Vicente Esteve 





We provide a test of the sustainability of the Spanish government deficit over the period 
1850-2000,  from  the  estimation  of  a  cointegration  relationship  between  government 
expenditures and revenues derived from the intertemporal budget constraint. The longer 
than usual span of the data allows us to obtain more robust results on the fulfilment of 
the intertemporal budget constraint than most of the previous analyses. Two additional 
robustness  checks  are  provided.  First,  we  investigate  the  possibility  of  structural 
changes occurring along the period analyzed, using the new approach of Kejriwal and 
Perron (2008, 2010) to testing for multiple structural changes in cointegrated regression 
models. Second, we investigate whether the behaviour of fiscal authorities has been 
non-linear, by means of the procedure of Hansen and Seo (2002) based on a threshold 
cointegration model. Our results show that (i) the government deficit has been strongly 
sustainable in the long run, (ii) no evidence is found on any significant structural break 
throughout the whole period, and (iii) fiscal sustainability has been attained due to the 
non-linear behaviour of fiscal authorities, which have only acted on the budget deficit 
when it has exceeded around 4.5% of GDP. 
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The sustainability of government deficits turns to be a crucial issue for economic policy. 
In principle, a deficit of the public sector can be sustainable in the short run provided 
that the government can borrow. However, if the interest rate on the government debt 
exceeds the growth rate of the economy, the resulting debt dynamics leads to an ever-
increasing  ratio  of  debt  to  GDP.  This  dynamics  of  debt  accumulation  can  only  be 
stopped if the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP becomes a surplus; or, alternatively, 
through a sufficiently large revenue from money creation, i.e., if seigniorage is allowed 
for. 
When assessing the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, the usual procedure 
consists of testing the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). In short, for 
the budget deficit being sustainable, the government must run future budget surpluses 
equal, in present-value terms, to the current value of its outstanding liabilities. There are 
several studies available on the sustainability of budget deficits; see, e.g., Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Smith and Zin (1991), Haug (1995), 
Quintos (1995), Martin (2000) or Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2009), to name 
a few. The results, though, seem to be still rather inconclusive due to differences in the 
econometric methodology, the particular specification of the transversality condition, 
and the sample period used. However, a common criticism to most of the available 
literature  is  that  the  econometric  procedures  used  require  a  large  number  of 
observations, which is not usually the case in most tests of the IBC. 
 
In this paper, we try to overcome this problem by using an extended data set 
covering 150 years, for the case of Spain. The Spanish case can be of interest given the 
permanent difficulties experienced when balancing the government budget across those 
years. For most of this period, and until the fiscal reform of 1978, public revenues were 
kept at a very low level in order not to clash with the interests of the upper classes of the 
society. Accordingly, revenues turned to be insufficient to finance even small amounts 
of  public  expenditures,  and  deficits  became  chronic,  leading  the  government  to  a 
continuous resource to seigniorage.  
 
The aim of this paper will be to provide a test of the sustainability of the Spanish 
government deficit over the period 1850-2000, from the estimation of a cointegration  
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relationship between government expenditures and revenues derived from the IBC. In 
this way, the longer than usual span of the data will allow us to obtain more robust 
results on the fulfilment of the IBC than in most of previous analyses. In addition, we 
will provide two  additional robustness  checks of the  estimated relationship between 
government expenditures and revenues. First, given the extended length of the sample, 
we investigate the possibility of structural changes occurring along the period analyzed. 
To this end, we will make use of the new approach of Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010) 
to test for multiple structural changes in cointegrated regression models. Second, as an 
extension  of  this  analysis,  we  further  investigate  whether  the  behaviour  of  fiscal 
authorities had been non-linear. We will do this by means of the procedure developed 
by Hansen and Seo (2002), based on a threshold cointegration model that considers the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between government expenditures and revenues. 
In particular, provided that fiscal sustainability holds, we analyze if fiscal authorities 
would have adjusted the deficit only  when the difference between  expenditures and 
revenues exceeded a certain threshold, thereby ensuring deficit sustainability in the long 
run.  
 
In Section  II, we present and briefly discuss our data set. The results of the 
sustainability test are presented in Section III; and those of the tests on structural change 
and non-linearity in Sections IV and V, respectively. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. The data 
We use data on total (i.e., inclusive of debt interest) expenditures, and total revenues, 
both measured as ratios to GDP, for the Spanish central government (i.e., excluding 
social security and local and regional governments), over the period 1850-2000. The 
data sources are Comín and Díaz (2005) for the public sector variables, and Prados de la 
Escosura (2003) for GDP. Notice that data on local governments are unavailable until 
1958,  whereas  regional  governments  were  just  established  after  the  approval  of  the 
current Constitution in 1978; also, social security only began to expand after 1966. The 
evolution of the two series appears in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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As discussed at length in Comín (1995, 1996), the behaviour of the Spanish 
public  sector  has  been  characterized  over  most  of  this  period  by  a  high  degree  of 
protection and regulation, in order to favour some particular groups and sectors, rather 
than satisfying collective needs (such as infrastructure, or social expenditures). Recall 
that, at that time and until, say, the first 1960s, Spain was a poor and underdeveloped 
country, according to Western Europe’s standards. The small levels of expenditure were 
explained  by  the  lack  of  revenues;  and  there  were  insufficient  revenues  since,  in  a 
context  of  limited  democracy,  governments  representing  the  wealthy  classes  of  the 
society were unwilling to affect their interests. Such a situation begins to change in the 
1960s, but the process of economic liberalization was insufficient and soon partially 
reverted,  so  Spain  had  to  wait  until  the  restoration  of  democracy  after  1977,  and 
especially the integration in the now European Union (EU) in 1986, to enjoy a public 
sector comparable to that of the rest of Western Europe.  
 
  Government  expenditure  was  kept  at  a  minimum  over  the  19th  century, 
according  to  the  principles  of  the  liberal  state.  A  greater  role  for  the  government 
involvement in the economy, especially regarding public works and social protection, 
appears between 1900 and 1935. Such a trend, however, finally arrived to a halt due to 
political instability and the lack of revenues. The increase in public expenditure after the 
end of the Spanish civil war was mainly due to the higher defence spending, and soon 
reverted to lower levels than in the pre-war years. Government expenditure as a ratio to 
GDP only began to increase in the mid-1960s, due to higher spending on education, 
housing, and social security; however, a modern welfare state was not developed due to 
the  lack  of  revenues.  The  process  of  modernization  of  the  Spanish  public  sector, 
coupled with an increase in the functions performed by the state, can be dated at the end 
of the 1970s, in the aftermath of the economic crisis of that period, the restoration of 
democracy and, later on, the integration into the EU. Accordingly, the last years have 
contemplated an intense process of building a welfare state on European standards, and 
the  development  of  modern  and  improved  infrastructure.  Even  so,  the  ratio  of 
government expenditure to GDP is still lower than the EU average. 
 
  On the other hand, over most of the period government revenues proved to be 
insufficient to finance expenditures, despite the fiscal reforms performed in 1845 (the 
first attempt to build a modern fiscal system), and 1900 (following the loss of the last  
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Spanish  colonies  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines).  The  inability  of  the  governments  to 
hinder the interests of the upper classes, coupled with the intense fiscal fraud, was at the 
root of this situation. The tax system for most of the period was built on French lines 
(the so called “Latin tax system”), and was based on the prevalence of indirect taxes, 
falling on specific consumption goods, and the setting of non-personal or product taxes, 
proportional and not progressive. The advantage of such a system was the simplicity of 
tax collection, but at the cost of an easy tax evasion. Only after the fiscal reform of 
1978, with the creation of a modern personal income tax, completed in 1986 with the 
introduction  of  the  value  added  tax  at  the  time  of  the  integration  into  the  EU,  the 
Spanish fiscal system can be thought to be comparable to that of the rest of Western 
Europe.  
 
Even if both revenues and expenditures remained at low levels, budget deficits 
dominated over most of the period, which led the government to a continuous resource 
to seigniorage until recent years, when a more orthodox financing of the deficits has 
been set up. In particular, from 1982 on budget deficits, previously financed mostly via 
credits from the Bank of Spain, were increasingly financed using market mechanisms, 
through the issuing of public debt. Finally, government deficit financing by the central 
bank  was  explicitly  forbidden  according  to  the  provisions  of  Article  104a  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  entering  into  force  on  November  1,  1993.  Despite  the  fact  that 
surpluses  prevailed  in  only  29  years  between  1850  and  2000,  in  relative  terms  the 
magnitude of the government deficit did not tend to increase along the period (Comín 
and Díaz, 2005, p. 878). 
 
 
III. The sustainability of Spanish budget deficits, 1850-2000 
The customary framework used to test for the sustainability of budget deficits starts 
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b      (1) 
where b and s denote, respectively, the total government debt and the primary budget 
surplus (i.e., excluding interest payments), both as ratios to GDP. In addition, E is the  
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expectations operator; and x and r stand, respectively, for the rate of growth of real GDP 
and the real interest rate, both assumed to be constant for simplicity.  
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i.e., the government must run expected future budget surpluses equal, in present-value 
terms, to the current value of its outstanding debt. 
 
  The cointegration framework to test for the IBC follows once first differences 
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Under  a  no-Ponzi  scheme  rule,  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (3)  will  be 
stationary  as  long  as  the  budget  surplus  and  the  stock  of  government  debt  are  all 
stationary in first differences.  In order to test for condition (4), the usual procedure 
consists of testing for the stationarity of  
∆bt = expt − revt 
where  expt  and  revt  denote  the  ratios  of  the  government’s  total  expenditures  and 
revenues, respectively, to GDP; that is, expt − revt would be the total budget deficit (i.e., 
including interest payments) as a ratio to GDP. Provided that both expt and revt are I(1) 
with a cointegration relationship (1, −1), one should then test the linear restriction β = 1 
in a regression model of the form:  
revt = α + βexpt + εt         (5) 
where εt is an error term. In particular, following Quintos (1995), if expt and revt are 
cointegrated and β = 1, the government deficit would be strongly sustainable; whereas, 
if 0 < β < 1, the deficit would be only weakly sustainable. Finally, if β = 0 the deficit 
would be unsustainable. 
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This framework has been applied in previous analyses of the sustainability of the 
Spanish government deficit, using data from 1964 to the second half of the 1990s; see 
Camarero,  Esteve  and  Tamarit  (1998),  de  Castro  and  Hernández  de  Cos  (2002),  or 
Escario (2005). A common result to these papers is the finding of an estimate of β 
positive but significantly different from one, indicating weak sustainability of the deficit 
in the sense of Quintos (1995); together with the finding of cointegration only in the 
presence of structural changes in the relationship, located around 1986-1988. 
 
On the other hand, Bohn (2007) has recently provided a critique of tests of the 
IBC  based  on  unit  root  and  cointegration  tests,  on  the  grounds  that  such  tests  are 
incapable  of  rejecting  sustainability,  suggesting  instead  the  estimation  of  error-
correction-type  policy  reaction  functions.  However,  the  application  of  the  more 
traditional procedure would give a sufficient condition for sustainability to hold, so, if 
the deficit were found to be sustainable, this would provide a stronger criterion to assess 
sustainability. In addition, this exercise will allow us to offer some extra evidence on 
the sustainability of the Spanish government deficit over a far more extended period
1. 
 
Now, we are in position of testing for the sustainability of the Spanish budget 
deficit  over  the  period  1850-2000,  using  the  data  on  government  expenditures  and 
revenues examined in the previous section. As a first step of the analysis, we test for the 
order  of  integration  of  the  variables  expt  and  revt  using  the  tests  of  Ng  and  Perron 
(2001). These authors propose using the tests statistics 
GLS Z M α  and 
GLS
t Z M , which are 
modified  versions  of  the  α Z   and  t Z   Phillips-Perron  tests;  and  ADF
GLS,  a  modified 
version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Such modifications improve the tests with 
regard to both size distortions and power. The results are shown in Table 1, and the null 
hypothesis of no stationarity cannot be rejected, independently of the test, for the two 
series in levels; at the same time that the presence of two unit roots is clearly rejected at 
the 1% significance level. Accordingly, both series are I(1). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
1   In a companion paper (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 2010), an alternative test of the 
sustainability of the Spanish government deficit over the period 1850-2000 is performed along 
the lines of Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2009), addressing Bohn’s (2007) critique and 
emphasizing the role of monetary versus fiscal policy dominance. 
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Next,  we  perform  a  cointegration  analysis  of  equation  (5)  over  the  whole 
sample. The estimation is made using the method of Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
(DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993), following the methodology proposed by Shin 
(1994). This method has the advantage of providing a robust correction to the possible 
presence of endogeneity in the explanatory variables, as well as of serial correlation in 
the error terms of the  OLS  estimation. On the other hand, the DOLS estimates are 
asymptotically equivalent to those obtained from Johansen’s (1988, 1991) maximum 
likelihood procedure, and would be more appropriate in this case since we have just two 
variables in the theoretical model
2. Accordingly, we first estimate a long-run dynamic 
equation including leads and lags of the (first difference of the) explanatory variable in 
equation (5): 




j φ ∆expt−1−j + νt     (6) 
where νt is an error term, and then perform Shin’s (1994) test from the calculation of Cµ, 
a LM statistic from the DOLS residuals which tests for deterministic cointegration (i.e., 
when no trend is present in the regression). 
 
The results of the estimation of equation (6) appear in Table 2. First of all, the 
null hypothesis of deterministic cointegration between revt and expt is not rejected at the 
1% level of significance. In addition, the estimate of β is 0.88, significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level; but not significantly different from one at the 1% level, 
according  to  a  Wald  test  on  the  null  hypothesis  β ˆ =1  against  the  alternative  β ˆ <1, 
distributed as a 
2
1 χ  and denoted in the table by WDOLS. Accordingly, the Spanish budget 
deficit has been strongly sustainable, according to Quintos’s (1995) terminology, over 
the whole period 1850-2000. Thus, when extending the sample period over a 150-year 
span, the budget deficit turns out to be strongly, rather than weakly, sustainable, unlike 
previous evidence available from the mid-1960s on.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
                                                 
2   Notice also that the DOLS estimates are preferable to Johansen’s, according to Monte Carlo 




IV. Testing for structural change 
Issues related to structural change have received a considerable amount of attention in 
the literature on statistics and econometrics; see Perron (2008) for a recent and far-
reaching  account  of  the  problem  of  testing  for  multiple  structural  changes  in  linear 
regression models. Accounting for parameter shifts is crucial in cointegration analysis 
as far as long spans of data are involved, as in this paper, since they are more likely to 
be affected by structural breaks.  
 
Recently, Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010) provide a comprehensive treatment 
of  the  problem  of  testing  for  multiple  structural  changes  in  cointegrated  systems. 
Structural  changes  can  manifest  themselves  through  changes  in  the  long-run 
relationship (6), either in the form of a change in the intercept, or in the slope of the 
cointegrating vector. In particular, the presence of structural changes affects the size of 
the residual-based test for the null hypothesis of cointegration by Shin (1994) when the 
true data generating process exhibits some type of structural break. 
 
Accordingly, we test for the stability of equation (6) using the tests of Kejriwal 
and Perron (2008, 2010). These authors propose three types of test statistics to test for 
multiple breaks in cointegrated regression models: 
 
a)  First, a sup Wald test of the null hypothesis of no structural break (m=0) versus 















where SSR0 and SSRk denote, respectively, the sums of squared residuals under 
the  null  hypothesis  of  no  breaks,  and  under  the  alternative  hypothesis  of  k 
breaks; λ={λ1, ..., λm} is the vector of breaks fractions defined by λi=Ti/T for 
i=1,..., m; and Ti are the break dates. 
 
b)  Second, a test of the null hypothesis of no structural break (m=0) versus the 
alternative hypothesis that there is an unknown number of breaks given some 
upper bound M (1≤m≤M):  
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1 max max  
 
c)  In addition to the tests above, Kejriwal and Perron also propose a sequential 
procedure that not only enables detection of parameter instability but also allows 
a consistent estimation of the number of breaks, i.e., a sequential test of the null 
hypothesis of k breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of k+1 breaks: 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { } 1 1 1 1
τ 1 1 / ˆ ,..., ˆ , τ , ˆ ,..., ˆ ˆ ,..., ˆ sup max | 1
ε ,
+ −
Λ ∈ + ≤ ≤ − = + k k j j T k T k j T SSR T T T T SSR T T SSR T k k F
j
 
  where  ( ) ( ) { } ε ˆ ˆ ˆ τ ε ˆ ˆ ˆ ; τ 1 1 1 ε , − − − − − ≤ ≤ − + = Λ j j j j j j j T T T T T T ,  and  the  model  with  k 
breaks is obtained by a global minimization of the sum of squared residuals. 
   
The results of applying the Kejriwal-Perron tests to the relationship between expt 
and revt are shown in Table 3. Both the intercept and the slope are allowed to change 
across regimes, and the level of trimming used is 15%, allowing up to five breaks. As 
can be seen, none of the tests proves to be significant and the sequential procedure 
selects no break point, which would point to a stable cointegrating relationship between 
the two variables over the whole period
3. A possible explanation to the failure to find 
any structural change in the long-run relationship between expt and revt might be that 
the  potential  candidate  years  (i.e.,  the  mid-1980s;  see  Section  II  and  the  previous 
evidence quoted in Section III) are located at the very end of the sample, leaving an 
insufficient number of observations available. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
V. Was fiscal policy non-linear? 
As shown before, Spanish fiscal policy has been strongly sustainable over the long run, 
along  the  period  1850-2000.  In  addition,  we  find  no  evidence  of  any  significant 
structural break over the whole period. In this section, we explore whether sustainability 
was attained due to the non-linear behaviour of fiscal authorities. In such a case, the 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium occurs only when the deviation with respect to 
                                                 
3   The results do not change significantly when using instead levels of trimming of 20% and 10%, 
allowing up to three and eight breaks, respectively.  
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this equilibrium exceeds a certain threshold; unlike the traditional approach, where it is 
assumed  that  the  long-run  equilibrium  always  exists.  In  particular,  regarding  the 
government deficit, if the behaviour of fiscal authorities were non-linear, they would 
adjust the deficit only when the difference between expenditures and revenues exceeded 
a certain threshold, thus ensuring the sustainability of the deficit in the long run. A 
theoretical justification of such behaviour is presented in Bertola and Drazen (1993) 
where,  regarding  the  timing  of  fiscal  actions,  they  argue  that  significant  cuts  in 
government spending take place only when the ratio of government spending to output 
hits a “trigger point”, which implies that abrupt changes in fiscal policy should not be 
observed  frequently.  In  other  words,  these  authors  introduce  a  non-linearity  in  the 
reaction function of policymakers.   
 
However, the empirical literature on fiscal sustainability has hardly incorporated 
the new developments on non-linearities in fiscal policy. A first attempt is Cipollini 
(2001),  who  introduces  a  regime  shift  in  the  adjustment  towards  a  linear  long-run 
(cointegrating) relationship between total government revenues and expenditures for the 
UK,  using  a  smooth  transition  error-correction  model  to  test  for  non-linearities  or 
asymmetries in the adjustment process. Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2004) 
find strong evidence of non-linearities in the evolution of the Spanish budget deficit in 
terms of a threshold autoregressive model, so that the deficit dynamics are different 
depending on whether the change in the deficit is below or above an endogenously 
estimated threshold. A similar analysis is applied to the US case by Arestis, Cipollini 
and Fattouh (2004). Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2006) re-examine the long-
run  sustainability  of  the  budget  deficit  in  the  Spanish  case,  finding  that  non-linear 
effects  occur  when  the  deficit  is  “big  enough”,  which  guarantees  its  long-run 
sustainability. More recently, a non-linear analysis on fiscal sustainability, using smooth 
transition  autoregressive  models,  has  been  also  applied  to  some  EMU  countries  by 
Arghyrou and Luintel (2007), who find that fiscal disequilibria adjust in a non-linear 
way to their long-run equilibrium in the countries analysed.  
 
  In this section, we will provide some additional evidence on the sustainability of 
budget  deficits,  when  fiscal  policy  is  conducted  as  a  non-linear  process.  However, 
unlike the above papers, we will make use of a much longer sample period, extending 
over 150 years, which should provide some more robustness to our empirical results. In  
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particular, we will try to quantify the “trigger point”; i.e., the precise moment in which 
the authorities correct a deficit, so that a required fiscal adjustment is finally enforced to 
ensure the deficit sustainability in the long run. To that end, we will follow Bertola and 
Drazen’s  (1993)  theoretical  contribution,  making  use  of  recent  developments  on 
threshold cointegration that consider the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
government expenditures and revenues.  
 
  The concept of threshold cointegration is introduced by Balke and Fomby (1997) 
as a feasible way to combine non-linearity and cointegration. The traditional approach 
assumes  that  the  error-correction  model  (ECM),  characterizing  systems  in  which 
variables are cointegrated, is present in every time period. On the contrary, Balke and 
Fomby (1997) show threshold cointegration as a possibility of a discrete adjustment, 
due to the presence of some adjustment costs on the side of economic agents. This type 
of  discrete  adjustment  is  particularly  useful  to  describe  the  behaviour  of  fiscal 
authorities, which only cut budget deficits when they were “too large”, in order to meet 
the IBC. In this way, threshold cointegration captures the possible non-linearity of fiscal 
policy, in the sense that the error correction mechanism should be expected only when a 
certain threshold is reached. 
 
  When  testing  for  threshold  cointegration,  Balke  and  Fomby  (1997)  propose 
applying several univariate tests previously developed in the literature to the known 
cointegrated residual (i.e., the error-correction term). More recently, Hansen and Seo 
(2002) examine the case of an unknown cointegrating vector. In particular, these authors 
propose a vector ECM (VECM) with one cointegrating vector and a threshold effect 
based  on  the  error-correction  term,  and  develop  an  LM  test  for  the  presence  of  a 
threshold effect. This will be the approach followed in this paper. 
 
  Hansen and Seo (2002) consider a two-regime threshold cointegration model, or 
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where  xt  is  a  p-dimensional  I(1)  time  series  that  is  cointegrated  with  one  p×1 
cointegrating vector β, wt(β) = β’xt is the I(0) error-correction term, ut is an error term, 
A1 and A2 are coefficient matrices, and γ is the threshold parameter. As can be seen, the 
threshold  model  (7)  has  two  regimes,  depending  on  whether  deviations  from  the 
equilibrium (defined by the value of the error-correction term) are below or above the 
threshold, where A1 and A2 describe the dynamics in each of the regimes. 
 
  Next, Hansen and Seo (2002) propose two heteroskedastic-consistent LM test 
statistics for the null hypothesis of linear cointegration (i.e., there is no threshold effect), 
against the alternative of threshold cointegration (i.e., model (7)). The first test is used 
when the true cointegrating vector is known a priori, and is denoted as:  
) , ( sup sup 0
0 γ β




where β0 is the known value of β (in the case analyzed below, β0 = 1); whereas the 
second test is used when the true cointegrating vector is unknown, and is denoted as: 
) ,
~
( sup sup γ β






is the null estimate of β. In both tests, [γL , γU] is the search region set so that γL 
is the π0  percentile of  1
~
− t w  and γU is the (1 − π0 ) percentile. 
   
We have applied the tests sup LM
0 (for a  given β = 1) and sup LM
 (for an 
estimated β). In both cases, as proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002), the p-values are 
calculated using a parametric bootstrap method (with 5,000 simulation replications). To 
select the lag length of the VAR, we have used the Akaike and Bayesian information 
criteria, both of them leading to l = 2. The results are reported in Table 4. Threshold 
cointegration appears at the 1% significance level when β is fixed at unity and when β is 
estimated  rather  than  fixed,  so  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  linear  cointegration  are  
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strongly rejected in both cases. According to the first test, the estimated threshold is  γ ~ = 
4.38, with the error-correction term defined as wt = expt – revt (i.e., the budget deficit). 
The  results  from  the  second  test  are  quite  similar,  with  β estimated  at  1.01  and  an 
estimated  threshold  of  γ ~ =  4.52,  or  4.64  in  terms  of  the  budget  deficit  (with  revt 
computed at its average value over the sample period), where the error-correction term 
is now defined as wt = expt – 1.01revt.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Hence, the first regime occurs when the government deficit as a ratio to GDP is 
above 4.38% or 4.64%, which would be the relatively unusual regime including around 
11% of the observations (namely, the years 1869, 1870, 1915, 1917, 1919, 1921, 1941, 
1943  to  1945,  1982,  1984  to  1986,  and  1993  to  1994).  In  particular,  the  main 
consolidation efforts would appear: 
-  following the so-called “Glorious Revolution” of 1868 
-  at the time of the First World War and immediately after 
-  in the first half of the 1940s, in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War  
-  at the end of the first half of the 1980s, immediately before joining the EU 
-  and in the years 1993-94, after a strong (and short-lived) recession; 
where the last two episodes were also identified in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve 
(2006). In turn, the second or usual regime, which applies to the remaining 89% of the 
observations, would occur when the government deficit as a ratio to GDP is below 
4.38% or 4.64%. 
 
  The  estimated  two-regime  threshold  VAR  (heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parentheses) for the first case (i.e., for a given β = 1; the results are 
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Significant error-correction effects appear in both regimes, but in the first regime the 
error-correction  effects  are larger in terms of significance and size of  the estimated 
coefficients,  i.e.,  when  either  government  expenditures  are  well  above  revenues  or 
government deficit is relatively high. 
   
Figure  2  plots  the  error-correction  effect,  i.e.,  the  estimated  response  of 
government expenditures and revenues to the discrepancy between them (i.e., to the size 
of the government deficit) in the previous period, holding the other variables constant. 
As can be seen, if the deficit is “large” (i.e., greater than 4.38% of GDP or rightwards of 
the threshold), both expenditures and revenues decrease sharply with the size of the 
deficit; and, since the response of expenditures is larger than that of the revenues, the 
government deficit falls accordingly. However, for a “small” deficit (i.e., lower than 
4.38% of GDP or leftwards of the threshold), the response of both expenditures and 
revenues is smaller. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Accordingly,  the  above  evidence  suggests  that  the  Spanish  fiscal  policy  has 
shown significant non-linear effects. In particular, budget deficits have shown a mean-
reverting dynamic behaviour once the threshold was reached, which in turn has assured 





In  this  paper,  we  have  tried  to  provide  some  additional  evidence  on  the  long-run 
sustainability of the Spanish government deficit, using an extended data set covering 
150 years. When assessing the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, the econometric  
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procedures usually employed require a large number of observations, which is not the 
case in most tests of the IBC. In order to overcome this problem we have made use of 
historical series for the period 1850-2000, so that the longer than usual span of the data 
allows us to obtain more robust results on the fulfilling of the IBC than in most of 
previous analyses, both for Spain and elsewhere. 
   
After estimating a cointegration relationship between government expenditures 
and  revenues  derived  from  the  IBC,  we  have  investigated  the  possible  presence  of 
structural  changes  following  the  new  approach  recently  proposed  by  Kejriwal  and 
Perron (2008, 2010), and we have checked the possible non-linear behaviour of fiscal 
authorities, using the procedure developed by Hansen and Seo (2002). The results show 
that the Spanish fiscal policy has been strongly sustainable over the long run, along the 
period analysed. Moreover, no evidence has been found of any significant structural 
break  throughout  the  whole  period,  which  would  point  to  a  stable  cointegrating 
relationship  between  government  expenditures  and  revenues.  In  addition,  when 
exploring the possibility of a non-linear behaviour on the side of the fiscal authorities, 
we  find  that  the  Spanish  fiscal  policy  has  shown  significant  non-linear  effects.  In 
particular, budget deficits have shown a mean-reverting dynamic behaviour once their 
value  exceeded  around  4.5%  of  GDP,  which  in  turn  has  assured  their  long-run 
sustainability. Notice, on the other hand, that the prevalence of budget deficits over 
most of the period (resulting from low levels of both revenues and expenditures) would 
not  be  at  odds  with  their  long-term  sustainability,  since  their  size  did  not  tend  to 
increase in relative terms along the period. 
 
To conclude, our result on the long-run sustainability of the Spanish government 
deficit says nothing on financing issues. As pointed out elsewhere, “(T)he history of the 
Spanish public debt until 1978 mirrors the main features of less developed countries, 
confirming the slow modernization of the Spanish Ministry of Finance” (Comín, 1995, 
p. 532), with frequent rescheduling of the government debt, and inflationary financing 
of the deficit. During the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century, deficits 
were  monetized  through  the  sales  of  government  bonds  to  the  Bank  of  Spain.  The 
system  changed  after  1917,  when  government  bonds  were  sold  instead  to  private 
buyers, mostly private banks, but with the particular feature that these bonds could be 
automatically pledged at the Bank of Spain, so that its effect on the monetization of the  
16 
deficit was not significantly different. Although this specific practice ended in the early 
1960s, for most of the period government deficits were ultimately  financed through 
seigniorage, leading to an inflationary trend; accordingly, monetary policy appeared to 
be subordinated to the needs of financing the budget deficit (Sabaté, Gadea and Escario, 
2006; Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 2010). Only in recent years, more orthodox 
practices  of  deficit  financing  became  prevalent,  in  particular  after  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht entered into force in 1993, so that the financing of budget deficits by the 
central banks was explicitly ruled out. These issues of fiscal sustainability and deficit 
financing merit further investigation in order to properly characterize the behaviour of 
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Response of expenditures and revenues to error correction 
 
 





Ng-Perron tests for unit roots 
 
       I(2) vs. I(1) 
  GLS Z M α  
GLS
t Z M  










       I(1) vs. I(0) 
  GLS Z M α  
GLS
t Z M  
GLS ADF  
revt  −8.18  −1.82  −1.83 





* denotes significance at the 1% level. The critical values are taken from Ng and Perron (2001), 
Table 1. 
(ii)  The  autoregressive  truncation  lag  has  been  selected  using  the  modified  Akaike  information 









Estimation of the long-run relationship:  
Stock-Watson-Shin cointegration tests 
 
α  β  Cµ  WDOLS 
0.19  0.88  0.144  1.20 
(0.67)  (7.57)     
 
Notes: 
(i)  t-statistics in parentheses. 
(ii)  The Cµ statistic is not significant at the conventional levels. The critical values are taken from 
Shin (1994), Table 1, for m=1. 
(iii)  The number of leads and lags selected was q=5≈INT(T
1/3), as proposed in Stock and Watson 
(1993). The long-run variance of the cointegrating regression residuals has been estimated using 
the Bartlett window with l=12≈INT(T






Kejriwal-Perron tests for structural change 
 
sup FT(1)  sup FT(2)  sup FT(3)  UD max  Number of 
breaks selected 
9.18  5.80  4.69  9.18  0 
 
Note:   No  test  statistic  is  significant  at  the  conventional  levels.  The  critical  values  are  taken  from 









Hansen-Seo tests for threshold cointegration 
 
  sup LM
0  sup LM 
Test statistic value  28.69  29.45 
Calculated p-values  0.004  0.001 
Threshold parameter  4.38  4.52 
Estimate of the cointegrating vector  1.00  1.01 
 
 
   
 
   
 